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Okay, let's break down this fascinating Sicha (discourse) from the Rebbe. The goal is to understand the Rebbe's line of reasoning, the questions he raises, and the profound answers he finds, all explained in a way that's easy to follow, even without a strong background in Jewish texts or Chassidic thought. **The Starting Point: A Verse and Rashi's Comment** The Sicha begins by focusing on a verse from this week's Torah portion, Parshas Behar (Leviticus chapter 25, verse 41). The Torah is discussing the laws of a Hebrew servant (`Eved Ivri`) – specifically, a Jew who, due to extreme poverty, had to sell himself into servitude to another Jew. The verse says that when the Jubilee year (`Shnas HaYovel`) arrives (a special year that occurred every 50 years, when slaves went free and land returned to its original owners), this servant "...shall go out from you—**he and his children with him**." Now, Rabbi Shlomo Yitzchaki, known by the acronym Rashi, is the most fundamental and essential commentator on the Torah. His commentary aims to explain the *p'shat* – the plain, straightforward meaning of the text. Rashi notices the phrase "**he and his children with him**" and quotes a teaching from the sage Rabbi Shimon: *Rashi says:* "Rabbi Shimon said: If *he* was sold, who sold his *children*? Rather, from here [we learn] that his master is obligated (`chayav`) in the sustenance (`mezonos` - food, basic needs) of his children." In simple terms, Rashi, citing Rabbi Shimon, asks: The father sold *himself*, but nobody sold the children into servitude. So why does the Torah mention them leaving *with him* as if they were also servants? The answer must be that this phrase isn't about the children being *freed* from servitude (since they weren't servants), but rather it teaches us a different law: throughout the time the father is a servant, the master has the responsibility to provide food and necessities for the servant's young children. They are "with him" under the master's care regarding sustenance. **The Rebbe's Questions Begin: Digging Deeper into Rashi** The Rebbe, known for his incredibly sharp and deep analysis of Rashi's commentary, immediately raises several questions about this seemingly simple explanation. He points out nuances that suggest there's more going on here than meets the eye. **Question 1: Why the Extra Words?** * **The Question:** Why does Rashi, quoting Rabbi Shimon, start with "If *he* was sold..."? The main point seems to be the question about the children: "...who sold his *children*?". Why include the seemingly unnecessary preface about the father being sold? * **Why it Matters:** Rashi is known for his extreme precision and conciseness. He doesn't waste words. If Rashi includes these words, they must be essential to understanding the verse's plain meaning. Furthermore, the Rebbe notes that while Rashi often quotes Talmudic or Midrashic sources (like Rabbi Shimon here), he frequently *adapts* or shortens them to fit the specific context and plain meaning of the verse. He doesn't just copy-paste. So, if Rashi *kept* these words from Rabbi Shimon's original statement, there must be a very good reason specific to this verse. **Question 2: The Contrast with Parshas Mishpatim** * **The Comparison:** The Rebbe points out that there's a similar situation discussed earlier in the Torah, in Parshas Mishpatim (Exodus chapter 21, verse 3). There, the Torah discusses a Hebrew servant (in that context, usually one sold by the court to pay back a theft) and says, "If he is the master of a wife [meaning, he was married when he became a servant], **his wife shall go out with him**." * **Rashi There:** Rashi on that verse *also* explains that this teaches the master's obligation for sustenance. But notice how Rashi phrases the question there: "Who brought her in [i.e., who made her a servant] that she should go out? Rather, this teaches that the buyer... is obligated in the sustenance..." * **The Question:** Look! In Mishpatim, Rashi asks the core question about the wife ("Who brought her in?") *without* the preface "If *he* was sold...". If the preface wasn't needed there for the wife, why is it suddenly needed here in Behar for the children? **Question 3: Rashi's Choice of Sources** * **The Talmudic Source:** The Rebbe reveals that the Talmudic source for Rashi's comment here (Rabbi Shimon in Tractate Kiddushin 22a) *also* contains Rabbi Shimon commenting on the Mishpatim verse about the wife, and Rabbi Shimon *uses the exact same structure* for both: "If *he* was sold, who sold his *wife*? From here..." * **The Question:** This makes the previous question even stronger! Rashi had Rabbi Shimon's statement available for *both* verses, using the preface "If *he* was sold..." in both cases. Yet, in Mishpatim, Rashi *ignored* Rabbi Shimon's phrasing and used a different formulation ("Who brought her in...?" likely based on a different source, the Mechilta). But here in Behar, Rashi *specifically chooses* to quote Rabbi Shimon's phrasing, including the preface. Why the inconsistency? Why use Rabbi Shimon's exact words here, but not there? **Question 4: Why Ask the Question at All?** * **Rashi's Style:** Rashi's usual style is to give the explanation directly, not necessarily to pose the question that leads to it. For example, he could have just said, "'He and his children with him' teaches that the master must support the children." * **Another Source:** The Rebbe notes that another ancient Rabbinic text, the Toras Kohanim (Sifra - the primary halachic commentary on Leviticus), commenting on our verse in Behar, *does* state the conclusion directly: "His master is obligated in the sustenance... of his children," *without* first posing the question "who sold his children?". * **The Question:** Why does Rashi deviate from his usual style and the approach of the Toras Kohanim here by explicitly including Rabbi Shimon's question ("who sold his children?") instead of just giving the bottom line? **An Initial Explanation (and why it's not enough)** The Rebbe first considers a simple explanation: Maybe Rashi's wording just mirrors the verse. Here in Behar, the verse says "*He* and his children," so Rashi includes "*he* was sold." In Mishpatim, the verse just says "his wife shall go out" (without explicitly saying "he"), so Rashi doesn't include the preface about "he." However, the Rebbe quickly dismisses this as superficial. Rashi isn't just playing with words. The phrase "If he was sold" isn't explaining the word "he" in the verse; it's a logical setup for the question about the children. If this setup is logically necessary, it should be necessary in Mishpatim too. If it's not logically necessary (as the Mishpatim commentary seems to imply), then Rashi, the master of brevity, wouldn't have included it here. **Conclusion from the Questions:** There must be a fundamental, *substantive* difference between the case of the servant in Mishpatim and the servant in Behar that explains all these discrepancies: why Rashi uses the preface here, why he quotes Rabbi Shimon by name here, why he includes the question explicitly, and why his approach differs from his commentary in Mishpatim. **A Contradiction Between Rashi's Comments?** The Rebbe introduces another layer of complexity: * **Rashi in Mishpatim (Revisited):** Remember, Rashi there (Exodus 21:3) concluded that the verse teaches the master must support "his wife *and his children*." But the verse only mentions "his wife"! * **Standard Explanation:** Many commentators explain that Rashi added "and his children" *incidentally*. He knew we learn about the children's sustenance from the verse in Behar, so while explaining the wife's sustenance from Mishpatim, he just threw in the children for completeness, relying on the reader knowing the source is actually later in Behar. (The Talmud even discusses why one might think the obligation applies *only* to the wife – perhaps she feels more shame begging than children do – suggesting the children's obligation isn't obvious from the wife's). Indeed, the Mechilta source connects the children's support back to the verse in Behar. * **The Rebbe's Problem with this:** This explanation is difficult for Rashi. Rashi explains the plain meaning, accessible even to a child. If the children's support *really* comes from a different verse, Rashi should have made that clear. Why make it seem like the Mishpatim verse teaches both? (The Rebbe also briefly notes: if Rashi adds the children incidentally in Mishpatim, why doesn't he add the *wife* incidentally here in Behar, since the Toras Kohanim *does* mention both wife and children here?) * **The Necessary Conclusion (and the Contradiction):** The Rebbe concludes that according to Rashi's *plain meaning* approach, one *must* be able to learn the obligation for the children's sustenance *from the Mishpatim verse itself* (the one about the wife). Perhaps through logic: if the master supports the wife, surely he supports the dependent children. * **But wait!** If we *can* learn about the children's support from Mishpatim, why does Rashi in Behar say, "*From here* (`mikan`)... we learn that the master is obligated in the sustenance of his children"? The word `mikan` emphasizes that the source is *specifically this verse in Behar*. This seems to directly contradict the idea that we already learned it (or could have learned it) from Mishpatim! It looks like Rashi is contradicting himself. **Resolving the Issues: A Crucial Distinction** The Rebbe now begins to unravel the puzzle, starting with another subtle linguistic point in Rashi's comment in Behar. **Linguistic Nuance: Active vs. Passive** * **Observation:** Rashi says: "If *he* was *sold* (`nimkar` - passive form)... who *sold* (`machran` - active form) his *children*?" Why the switch from passive ("was sold") to active ("sold")? Shouldn't it be consistent? Either "If he was sold, who were his children *sold* (`nimk'ru` - passive)?" or "If he *sold himself* (`machar atzmo` - active), who *sold* his children (`machran` - active)?" * **Comparison to the Source:** This becomes even more intriguing when the Rebbe points out that the Talmudic source (Rabbi Shimon) actually *does* use the passive form consistently: "If *he* was sold (`nimkar`), were his children *sold* (`nimkarim`)?" Rashi *deliberately changed* the verb form for the children from passive ("were sold") to active ("sold")! Why? **The Explanation: Halacha vs. P'shat (Law vs. Plain Meaning)** * **Halacha (Jewish Law):** According to established Jewish law, derived from interpretations of verses (like Exodus 21:7 "If a man sells his *daughter*..." implies *daughter*, yes; *son*, no), a father *cannot* sell his minor son into servitude. Therefore, the Talmud's question makes perfect sense in a halachic context: "Were his children *sold*?" The implied answer is "No, they *cannot* be sold by him!" * **P'shat (Plain Meaning):** However, Rashi is explaining the *plain* meaning of the text. Reading the verses simply, the Rebbe argues, one wouldn't necessarily derive the prohibition against selling a son from the verse about selling a daughter (since that whole section deals with the specific laws of a Hebrew maidservant). From a purely *p'shat* perspective, without the layers of halachic derivation, there's no obvious reason why a destitute father *couldn't* sell his son. * **Rashi's Change Explained:** Therefore, Rashi, focusing on *p'shat*, operates under the premise that selling a son *might* be possible in theory according to the simple reading. So, the question isn't "Were they sold?" (implying impossibility based on Halacha), but "*Who* sold them?" (assuming they *could* be sold, but questioning the *agent* – the father sold himself, but who would have performed the action of selling the children?). **Understanding Rashi's Full Phrasing in Behar** With this understanding (that according to *p'shat*, selling children might be theoretically possible, but didn't happen here), we can now understand Rashi's full phrasing: 1. **Why the Preface "If he was sold..."**: Rashi isn't just bothered by "and his children with him," he's also bothered by the word "*he*" in "**he** and his children with him." The verse already said the servant "shall go out." Why add "*he* and his children"? * One might mistakenly think (based on the *p'shat* possibility of selling children) that the verse addresses two scenarios of poverty (`ki yamuch achicha` - "if your brother becomes poor"): a) "He shall go out" – when only the father sold himself. b) "*He* and his children with him" – when the father was so poor he sold *both* himself *and his children*. The verse would then be teaching that *all* go free at Yovel. * Rashi uses the preface to refute this interpretation: "If *he* was sold" - okay, the Torah explicitly says the father was sold (`venimkar lach` - "and is sold to you"). But "*who sold his children*?" Where does the Torah *ever state* that the children were actually sold in this scenario, requiring a verse to tell us they go free? Nowhere. * Therefore, Rashi concludes, the phrase "*he* and his children with him" *cannot* be about release from servitude for the children. "*Rather*, (`ela`) *from here* (`mikan`) we learn that the master is obligated in the sustenance of his children." The phrase means they are "with him" under the master's care *for food and needs*. 2. **Why Rashi Mentions "He"**: The verse includes "he" ("*he* and his children") because, as the Rebbe will explain further, the obligation for the master to provide sustenance is a *novelty* (`chiddush`) even for the servant *himself* in this specific case. So the verse highlights the obligation extends to *both* the servant ("he") and his dependents ("his children"). 3. **(Contrast with Mishpatim Explained):** In Mishpatim, the verse just says "his wife shall go out with him," without the extra "he." There's no ambiguity suggesting the wife was also sold, so Rashi doesn't need the "If *he* was sold..." preface to counter a potential misunderstanding. **The Core Difference: Two Types of Hebrew Servants** Now the Rebbe brings in the fundamental distinction that resolves everything, a point Rashi himself made back in Parshas Mishpatim: * **Servant in Mishpatim:** Deals with a Jew sold by the court (`Beis Din`) because he stole and couldn't repay. This is an *involuntary* sale from the servant's perspective. * **Servant in Behar:** Deals with a Jew who sells *himself* (`mocher atzmo`) due to extreme poverty. This is a *voluntary* transaction between the servant and the master. **How this Distinction Affects Sustenance:** * **Sold by Court (Mishpatim):** When the court sells someone, they have a responsibility to ensure the family he leaves behind is cared for. The master's obligation to support the wife (as stated in the verse) is essentially a condition imposed by the court as part of the sale arrangement. * *Logical Extension:* If the court ensures the wife (who could potentially work) is supported, it's logical (`kal vachomer` - an a fortiori argument) that they *must* also ensure the young children (who *cannot* work) are supported. * *Rashi Explained:* This is why Rashi in Mishpatim *could* add "and his children" based on the verse about the wife. He wasn't necessarily relying on the later verse in Behar; he was applying the logic inherent in the court-managed sale described in Mishpatim. The obligation stems from the court's responsibility. * **Sells Himself (Behar):** When a man sells himself voluntarily due to poverty, the court isn't involved. It's a private agreement. Logically, the master only bought the man's labor. Why should he be obligated to support the man's family? They have no contract with him. One might think the servant himself must figure out how to support them, or they should rely on community charity like other poor people. * *The Novelty (`Chiddush`) in Behar:* Therefore, the verse here in Behar, "**and his children with him**," comes to teach a *new law*, a specific decree of the Torah that applies *even in this case*: "*From here* (`mikan`) we learn that the master is obligated in the sustenance of his children." It's not derived from logic or the circumstances of the sale; it's a unique Torah obligation revealed in this verse. This explains why Rashi emphasizes "*mikan*" – the source is specifically *here*. **Sustenance for the Servant Himself is Also a Novelty Here** The Rebbe adds that in the case of the self-sold servant (`mocher atzmo`), even the master's obligation to provide basic sustenance for the *servant himself* is somewhat of a novelty. One could argue the master only owes the purchase price agreed upon. Why should he provide food and board? Perhaps only the bare minimum to keep the servant capable of working (`lechem tzar u'mayim lachatz` - meager bread and scant water). Therefore, the Torah emphasizes "*He* (and his children with him)" to teach that the master must provide proper, normal sustenance (`mezonos`) for the servant himself, not just minimal rations. **Putting it All Together: Why Rashi's Comments Differ** Now all the initial questions are resolved: * **Why the preface "If he was sold..." in Behar?** To counter the potential *p'shat* misunderstanding that the children might have *also* been sold, and to highlight that the verse is teaching about sustenance, not release. This isn't needed in Mishpatim where the context (court sale) makes it clear only the man was sold. * **Why quote Rabbi Shimon by name in Behar?** Because Rabbi Shimon's formulation perfectly captures the *p'shat* issue here (active "who sold them?" reflecting the theoretical possibility vs. halachic impossibility). Also, as we'll see, Rabbi Shimon's deeper philosophy is key. * **Why ask the question explicitly ("who sold...") in Behar?** To emphasize the logical problem (they weren't sold, so why mention them?) that leads to the novel conclusion about sustenance in *this specific case* of a self-sold servant. * **Why Rashi doesn't add "wife" in Behar?** Because the *p'shat* of *this* verse ("he and his children") only teaches the novel obligation for the *children* in the case of a self-sold servant. Whether the master must also support the wife in this case might depend on other factors (e.g., does he benefit from her presence? This might be derived from logic or the Mishpatim case, but it's not learned *mikan*, from this verse). Rashi sticks strictly to what *this* verse teaches. * **Is there a contradiction?** No. Mishpatim teaches the obligation (stemming from the court's involvement) for wife and, logically, children. Behar teaches a *separate*, novel Torah obligation for the children (and implicitly, the servant himself) specifically in the case of a self-sold servant, where logic or circumstance alone wouldn't dictate it. The emphasis "*mikan*" in Behar is correct because this obligation, in *this* context, is learned only from *here*. **The Deeper Reason: Rabbi Shimon's Perspective on Father and Child** A sharp student might still ask: *But why?* Why did the Torah impose this obligation on the master of a self-sold servant to support children from whom he gets no benefit? Why aren't they just like other poor people? The Rebbe explains that Rashi hints at the answer by specifically naming **Rabbi Shimon**. What's special about Rabbi Shimon's view? * **Rabbi Shimon on Legacy:** Rabbi Shimon famously stated (in Tractate Bava Basra 116a) that God is, so to speak, filled with anger when a person doesn't leave behind a "son to inherit him" (`ben l'yorsho`). The focus isn't just on having children, but on the child as an inheritor, a continuation of the parent. * **Father and Son as One Entity:** For Rabbi Shimon, a child, especially a son who inherits, is not just related to the father; they are a direct continuation, almost an extension of the father's very being. They "stand in the father's place," representing an unbroken chain. * **Explaining the Sustenance Obligation:** This perspective illuminates the master's obligation. Since the children are considered an essential extension of the father (the servant), the master's responsibility towards the servant naturally extends to this "part of the servant" embodied in his children. Just as he must sustain the servant ("He"), he must sustain the children ("his children with him") because they are intrinsically linked, almost one unit in this conceptual framework. * **(Textual Harmony):** The Rebbe notes this fits beautifully with the end of the verse (Leviticus 25:41): "...he and his children with him... and he shall return... to the **possession of his fathers** (`achuzas avosav`)." Rashi there explains "possession of his fathers" means returning to the *honor* or *status* of his ancestors. Just as the servant and children form a unit going out, the servant is linked back to his forefathers. The father-child bond and the connection to ancestry are part of the same continuum. **The Mystical Dimension: Servitude as Exile (`Galus`)** Finally, the Rebbe reveals a profound allegorical meaning (`remez`) embedded in Rashi's words, connecting the laws of the servant to the condition of the Jewish people in exile (`Galus`). * **Servitude = Exile:** The state of being sold into servitude is a metaphor for the Jewish people's exile among the nations. * **God and Israel in Exile:** The phrase "he and his children with him" can be understood allegorically: "He" refers to God (our Father in Heaven - `Avinu Shebashamayim`), and "his children" refers to the Jewish people (`Banim LaMakom` - children of the Omnipresent). Both, in a sense, went into exile together. This echoes another famous statement by Rabbi Shimon (Tractate Megillah 29a): "Beloved are Israel... wherever they were exiled, the Divine Presence (`Shechinah`) went with them." * **Rabbi Shimon's Deeper Point Here:** Rashi quoting Rabbi Shimon's specific formulation ("If *He* was sold, who sold His *children*?") offers an even deeper insight: * God ("He"), being All-Powerful, can "enter" exile without being diminished or controlled by it. * But "His children – who sold them?" How can the Jewish people, God's children, be truly *sold* or subjugated by exile? If exile had total power over a Jew, their essential identity as God's child couldn't be revealed. * **The Answer: Body vs. Soul:** Rabbi Shimon's answer (via Rashi) is that the "selling" into exile only affects the "sustenance" (`mezonos`) – the physical, bodily aspects of life. These physical needs pass through the domain of the ruling powers of exile (symbolized by the `Sar HaMedinah`, the nation's governing angel). However, the essential being, the Jewish soul (`neshama`), is *never* truly sold or subjugated by exile. (The Rebbe alludes to the famous Chassidic saying: "Only our bodies were given over into exile... but our souls were not driven into exile..."). * **Example: The Temple:** The physical destruction (`Churban`) affected only the wood and stones of the Temple, over which the nations gained temporary control. But the true, spiritual Temple, the sanctuary God dwells in "within each Jew" (Exodus 25:8: "Make Me a sanctuary, and I will dwell *within them*"), cannot be destroyed or exiled. * **Sustenance in Exile:** One might still think that regarding physical needs (`mezonos`), exile *does* have control, potentially forcing Jews to compromise their values. Here, Rabbi Shimon's conclusion is pivotal: "*From here* we learn that *his master* is obligated (`chayav`) in the sustenance of his children." * Allegorically: God ("the Master") merely arranges for Jewish sustenance during exile to be channeled *through* the gentile powers (the figurative "master" in exile). * However, these powers have no independent authority ("like an axe in the hand of the one who chops"). * Furthermore, this "master" (the power facilitating sustenance) is *obligated* (`chayav`) by Divine decree to provide for the physical needs of the Jewish people ("His children"). * Therefore, even during exile, Jews ultimately receive abundant life, children, and livelihood (`banei, chayei, u'mezonei revichei`) in a way that is openly good, because the ultimate source and guarantor is God Himself, working *through* the system of exile. **In Summary:** The Rebbe takes a seemingly straightforward Rashi comment and, through a series of penetrating questions, uncovers layers of meaning. He resolves apparent contradictions by highlighting the crucial distinction between the two types of Hebrew servants discussed in the Torah. He reveals the underlying logic of Rashi's precise wording, connecting it to the difference between *p'shat* and *Halacha*. He illuminates the deeper philosophical reason for the law by linking it to Rabbi Shimon's view of the intrinsic father-child connection. Finally, he elevates the entire discussion to the allegorical plane, showing how these laws contain profound lessons about God's relationship with the Jewish people, the nature of exile, and the ultimate guarantee of both spiritual integrity and physical sustenance even within the challenges of `Galus`.