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B"H Okay, let's break down this Sicha (a talk or discourse by the Rebbe) step by step. The Rebbe is analyzing a specific detail from the weekly Torah portion, *Tzav*, concerning the daily offering of the *Kohen Gadol* (High Priest), and through this analysis, he reveals deeper insights into Jewish thought and practice. **The Core Topic: The High Priest's Daily Meal Offering (Chavitei Kohen Gadol)** Imagine the Holy Temple in Jerusalem (the *Beit HaMikdash*). It was the central hub of Jewish spiritual life, and various offerings (*korbanot*) were brought there daily. One unique offering discussed in this week's Torah portion (Leviticus Chapter 6) is the *Chavitei Kohen Gadol*. * **What it is:** A special meal offering (made of fine flour, oil, and frankincense, prepared on a griddle – *machavat*) that the *Kohen Gadol* (High Priest) was required to bring *every single day* (*Tamid* means constantly, or daily in this context). * **Funding:** The Kohen Gadol had to pay for this offering himself, from his personal funds. * **Timing:** Half of the offering was brought in the morning, and the other half in the evening. **Section A: The Dispute – What Happens if the High Priest Dies?** The Sicha starts by presenting a scenario discussed in the Mishnah and Gemara (foundational texts of Rabbinic Judaism): * **Scenario:** The Kohen Gadol dies, and a successor hasn't been appointed yet. What happens to his daily offering? Does it just stop? * **The Dispute:** The Sages disagree on this. * **Rabbi Shimon says:** The offering continues, but now it's paid for by the *community* (*Tzibbur*) from public funds (specifically, the *Terumat HaLishkah*, funds collected annually for communal offerings). * **Rabbi Yehuda says:** The offering continues, but it's paid for by the *heirs* (*Yorshim*) of the deceased Kohen Gadol until a new one is appointed. * **Basis for the Dispute:** The Gemara explains that their disagreement stems from how they interpret verses in Leviticus (6:15): * Rabbi Yehuda focuses on: "And the Kohen who is anointed *in his place from his sons* shall perform it." He interprets this somewhat creatively to mean: "When the anointed Kohen (the High Priest) dies, the one *in his place* (i.e., the obligation continues), *one from his sons* (or more broadly, his heirs) shall perform it (by funding it)." * Rabbi Shimon focuses on a later phrase in the verse (6:15, though some versions place it earlier): "*Chukat Olam*" – "an eternal statute." He interprets *Olam* (eternal/world) to imply it comes from the "world," meaning the community's funds. * **The Rebbe's Initial Insight:** The Rebbe points out something crucial in the *way* the Mishnah phrases the question: "*M'shal mi hayta k'reiva?*" – "From *whom* was it brought?" This language, and the nature of the dispute, implies that the *obligation itself* to bring the offering *continues* even when the Kohen Gadol dies. The debate is only about *who pays*. This isn't a *new* obligation arising after his death; it's the *same* obligation carrying over. * **Connecting the Dots:** Based on this, the Rebbe suggests a deeper layer: This argument about who pays *after* death likely reflects a fundamental disagreement about the very *nature and purpose* of the *Chavitei Kohen Gadol* even when the High Priest is alive and bringing it himself. **Section B: What *Is* the Nature of the High Priest's Offering? Individual or Communal?** The Rebbe now explores the possible underlying disagreement about the offering's essence: * **Is it purely individual?** Since the Kohen Gadol pays for it himself, it seems like his personal offering (*Korban Yachid*). * **Or is it like a communal offering?** Does it have aspects of a *Korban Tzibbur* (communal offering)? The Rebbe connects this question to different explanations given by classic commentators (*Meforshim*) for *why* this Mitzvah exists (*Ta'amei HaMitzvot* - reasons for the commandments): 1. **The Communal View (Sefer HaChinuch):** * The *Sefer HaChinuch* (a classic work outlining the 613 commandments and their reasons) explains that the Kohen Gadol is the primary intermediary, the representative (*Shliach*) between the Jewish people and God. He prays for them, and his service brings atonement (*kapparah*) for them. * Therefore, this daily offering is fitting for such a figure; it's like *his* version of the daily communal offerings (the *Korban Tamid* – the daily lamb offerings brought morning and evening for the entire nation). It benefits both him *and them*. * This view makes the *Chavitei Kohen Gadol* seem very much *like* a communal offering, brought *by* the representative *for* the community's benefit. The fact that it's brought alongside the actual *Korban Tamid* reinforces this connection. 2. **The Individual View (Other Commentators, e.g., Abarbanel):** * Many other commentators focus on the Kohen Gadol himself. For example, the *Abarbanel* suggests reasons like: * It fosters humility in the Kohen Gadol, making him stand before God like a poor person bringing a simple meal offering. * It ensures that *both* an individual offering (his) and a communal offering (the *Tamid*) are brought daily, representing both the particular and the general connection to God. * These explanations frame it as a deeply *personal* offering related to the Kohen Gadol's unique status and spiritual state. * **The Rebbe's Synthesis:** The Rebbe proposes that the dispute between R' Shimon and R' Yehuda directly reflects these two ways of understanding the offering: * **If you see it as fundamentally communal-like (Chinuch's view):** Then it makes sense that if the representative (Kohen Gadol) is gone, the community (*Tzibbur*) itself takes over the responsibility. This aligns with **Rabbi Shimon**. * **If you see it as fundamentally personal (Abarbanel's view):** Then it makes sense that if the individual (Kohen Gadol) dies, his personal obligations fall to his estate, i.e., his heirs (*Yorshim*). This aligns with **Rabbi Yehuda**. **Section C: Understanding Rambam's Ruling** Now the Rebbe turns to *Rambam* (Maimonides), one of the greatest codifiers of Jewish law. Rambam rules according to Rabbi Yehuda. * **Rambam's Wording:** Rambam writes (Laws of Daily Offerings 4:16, paraphrased): "If the Kohen Gadol died in the morning after offering the first half [of the *Chavitin*], and another Kohen was not appointed, the *heirs* bring a *full* tenth-ephah [the standard amount for the *Chavitin*] *'avur kapparaso'* – **'for his atonement'**." * **The Rebbe's Questions:** 1. Why does Rambam add this phrase "for his atonement"? It's not explicit in the Gemara's discussion of R' Yehuda's view. Where does he get it, and what does it mean here? 2. Another point: R' Yehuda derives his view from the phrase "from his sons" (*mibanav*) but applies it to "heirs" (*yorshim*). This is significant because "heirs" can include daughters, who inherit property but cannot become Kohanim or perform Temple service. How can R' Yehuda justify obligating heirs who might not even be eligible Kohanim, especially when the verse mentions "sons"? * **The Rebbe's Answer:** Rambam's phrase "for his atonement" is the key! * It explains *why* the heirs bring it according to R' Yehuda's view (which sees the offering as personal): The offering is intrinsically linked to the *Kohen Gadol's personal atonement* and spiritual process. When he dies mid-process (or before the day's offering is complete), finishing it is necessary *for him*. * This also explains why *all* heirs, even daughters, are obligated. They are not bringing an offering *as themselves*; they are fulfilling an obligation *of the deceased*. It's *his* offering, needed *for his atonement*, being funded by his estate, which the heirs inherit. Their personal status (male/female, Kohen/non-Kohen) is irrelevant to this financial obligation stemming from the deceased. *(Side note: The Rebbe also briefly mentions that "sons" who are Kohanim *do* bring their own *Chavitin* on the day they are initiated into the priesthood, showing they *can* bring this type of offering, but Rambam's point applies even when the heirs are daughters or non-eligible sons).* **Section D: Understanding Rashi's Commentary** The Rebbe now shifts focus to *Rashi*, the most famous commentator on the Torah and Talmud, looking at his comments on the verses about the *Chavitin*. * **Verse 1 (Lev. 6:15):** "And the Kohen who is anointed *in his place from his sons* shall perform it... *Kalil Tiktar* (entirely it shall be burned)." * **Rashi's Comment 1:** On "anointed in his place from his sons," Rashi simply rearranges the words: "The anointed *from his sons in his place*." * **Rashi's Comment 2:** On "*Kalil Tiktar*," Rashi explains: "It is not subject to *Kemitza* [the ritual scooping out of a handful] for the remainder [*Shirayim*] to be eaten, but rather *the whole thing is Kalil* [entirely burned]." * **Verse 2 (Lev. 6:16):** "And *every* meal offering of a Kohen *Kalil Tihyeh* (shall be entire); it shall not be eaten." * **Rashi's Comment:** On "*Kalil*," Rashi explains: "*Kulah shaveh la'Gavoah*" – "It is *entirely equal* for the High [i.e., for God/the altar]." * **The Rebbe's Questions about Rashi:** 1. **Word Order Change:** Why does Rashi bother rearranging the words in the first comment? It seems trivial. What understanding does it add or change? 2. **Elaborate Explanation of *Kalil Tiktar*:** Why does Rashi give such a detailed explanation for *Kalil Tiktar* ("not subject to Kemitza *for eating*...")? Doesn't "*Kalil*" just mean "entirely burned"? It seems obvious. Furthermore, Rashi himself used the word "*Kalil*" earlier in the chapter (on verse 6:13) when distinguishing between Israelite offerings (which have *Kemitza*) and Kohen offerings (which are *Kalil*) *without* giving any explanation, implying the meaning *is* straightforward! So why explain it so elaborately *here*? 3. **Inconsistent Explanations of *Kalil*:** Why does Rashi give *different* explanations for *Kalil* in two adjacent verses? First, he explains *Kalil Tiktar* by reference to Kemitza and eating. Then, on the very next verse, he defines *Kalil Tihyeh* simply as "entirely equal for God." Why the difference? And why wait until the *second* verse to give a direct definition ("entirely equal for God")? This progression seems illogical. **Section E: The Rebbe's Resolution of Rashi's Commentary** The Rebbe explains that Rashi's seemingly odd comments are actually a precise and brilliant exposition based on a subtle difference in the Hebrew wording: * **The Key Difference:** Verse 15 says *Kalil **Tiktar*** (entirely *it shall be **burned** / go up in smoke*). Verse 16 says *Kalil **Tihyeh*** (entirely *it **shall be***). The verb changes. * **Rashi's Insight:** Rashi uses this difference to teach that there are *two distinct ways* an offering can be "entirely for God" (*Kalil*): 1. ***Kalil Tiktar*** **(Kohen Gadol's Offering - Verse 15):** Rashi's lengthy explanation ("*not* subject to Kemitza *for the remainder to be eaten*, but rather the whole thing is *Kalil*") is carefully crafted. It *doesn't* mean there's no Kemitza at all. It means there *is* Kemitza (the standard ritual scooping), BUT the usual consequence (eating the remainder) doesn't happen. Instead, *both* the scooped handful (*Kometz*) *and* the remainder (*Shirayim*) are burned on the altar ("*Tiktar*"). The Gemara (Menachot 74a) confirms this process: "The handful is offered by itself, and the remainder is offered by itself." So, *Kalil Tiktar* means: It undergoes Kemitza, but *everything* ends up being burned. 2. ***Kalil Tihyeh*** **(Any Kohen's Offering - Verse 16):** Rashi's explanation ("entirely *equal* for the High") means something different. Here, there is *no Kemitza at all*. The offering *remains whole* (*Tihyeh* - it *shall be* entire) and is offered up undivided. It's "equal" in the sense that no part is separated for a different purpose (like eating). * **Why Rashi Explained It This Way:** Rashi needed the long explanation for *Kalil Tiktar* to clarify the *unusual* type of Kemitza involved (where nothing is eaten). For *Kalil Tihyeh*, where there's no Kemitza, the simple definition "entirely equal for God" suffices. The progression now makes sense: he first explains the complex case, then defines the simpler concept behind the word *Kalil* itself in the second instance. **Section F: Why the Difference? Connecting Rashi Back to the Offering's Nature** Why would the Kohen Gadol's *Chavitin* have Kemitza (but still be fully burned), while a regular Kohen's meal offering has no Kemitza at all? * **The Rebbe's Explanation (Building on Section B):** Rashi, interpreting the plain meaning of the text (*Pshat*), likely views the Kohen Gadol's daily (*Tamid*) offering as being fundamentally *like a communal offering* (as suggested by the Chinuch). * **Implication 1:** Because it's like a communal offering (or any standard meal offering brought on the main Altar), it *should* undergo *Kemitza*. That's the standard procedure for most meal offerings. * **Implication 2:** However, since it is, after all, being brought *by* a Kohen (the Kohen Gadol), it shares a characteristic with other Kohen offerings: the remainder (*Shirayim*) is *not eaten* (Leviticus 6:16 explicitly forbids eating any Kohen's meal offering). * **Result:** Combining these two aspects leads precisely to the unique procedure Rashi derived for *Kalil Tiktar*: It *has* Kemitza (like a public/standard offering) but *nothing is eaten* (like a Kohen's offering), meaning both parts are burned. * **Explaining Rashi's Word Order Change (Revisited):** Now we can understand why Rashi changed the word order in Lev. 6:15 ("The anointed *from his sons in his place*"). * Rashi is preemptively blocking the interpretation of Rabbi Yehuda (who used "from his sons" to refer to the *heirs* bringing the offering if the Kohen Gadol dies). * By linking "from his sons" directly to "the anointed one," Rashi emphasizes in the plain meaning (*Pshat*) that the verse is talking about the *successor* Kohen Gadol (who ideally should come from the previous one's sons if qualified) being the one obligated to bring *his own* daily *Chavitin*. * According to Rashi's likely understanding (that the *Chavitin* is communal-like, tied to the *role* of Kohen Gadol as representative), it wouldn't make sense for ordinary sons or heirs (who are *not* the Kohen Gadol, not the community's representative) to bring this specific offering. So, Rashi structures his comment to support the view that the obligation rests solely on the *acting* Kohen Gadol. **Section G: Another Point of Disagreement – Is the Daily Obligation Obvious?** The Rebbe brings in another related Talmudic discussion (Menachot 74a) to further illustrate the difference between Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Shimon, based on their core views identified earlier. * **The Gemara's Question:** Rabbi Shimon used the phrase "*Chukat Olam*" ("an eternal statute") to prove the offering comes from communal funds if the Kohen Gadol dies. The Gemara asks: What does Rabbi Yehuda (who thinks the heirs pay) do with this phrase? * **The Answer:** R' Yehuda needs "*Chukat Olam*" to teach that the offering must be brought *every single day, forever* (*le'olam*). * **Tosafot's Explanation:** The commentary *Tosafot* clarifies why R' Yehuda would need a special verse for this. One might mistakenly think that only Aaron (the first Kohen Gadol) brought it daily, while subsequent Kohanim Gedolim only brought it on the day they were inaugurated (*yom chinuchem*), not every day thereafter. R' Yehuda needs "*Chukat Olam*" to establish the *perpetual daily* obligation. Tosafot adds that Rabbi Shimon *doesn't* need this verse for that purpose; he understands the daily obligation inherently. * **The Rebbe's Question:** Why would they disagree on something seemingly basic – whether the command "Mincha *Tamid*" (a *daily* meal offering) requires an extra verse to prove it's *truly* daily and perpetual? * **The Rebbe's Answer (Connecting to the Core Theme):** This goes back to their fundamental views: * **Rabbi Shimon (Communal-like view):** Obligations associated with the *community* (*Tzibbur*) are inherently perpetual and continuous. The Jewish people as a collective entity are considered eternal ("*Tzibbur lo met*" - the community does not die). For R' Shimon, since the *Chavitin* is *like* a communal offering, its daily nature (*Tamid*) naturally implies it continues every day, forever, just like the actual *Korban Tamid*. No extra verse is needed to prove this continuity. * **Rabbi Yehuda (Individual view):** Obligations on an *individual* (*Yachid*) are typically not assumed to be perpetual in the same way. People are mortal. For R' Yehuda, since the *Chavitin* is the Kohen Gadol's *personal* offering, the term *Tamid* (daily) might not automatically imply "every single day forever without exception." Therefore, he *needs* the explicit phrase "*Chukat Olam*" to establish that this *specific* individual obligation is, unusually, perpetual and required daily for all time. **Section H: The Nature of "Daily" – Continuous Flow or Daily Renewal?** The Rebbe takes this distinction even further, suggesting the difference isn't just *if* a proof is needed for continuity, but the very *nature* of that continuity. * **Communal Continuity (R' Shimon's view):** A communal obligation might be seen as *one single, unbroken, continuous* obligation that flows through time, mirroring the continuous existence of the community itself. * **Individual Continuity (R' Yehuda's view):** Since an individual's existence isn't continuous in the same way, how can their obligation be? The Rebbe suggests that for R' Yehuda, "*Mincha Tamid*" might mean that *each new day brings a fresh, distinct obligation* for the Kohen Gadol to bring the offering. It's not one flowing obligation, but a series of daily recurring ones. * **Analyzing a Midrash (Torat Kohanim/Sifra):** The Rebbe supports this idea with a *Midrash Halacha* (a rabbinic text deriving law from scripture) on Leviticus 6:13: "This is the offering of Aaron and his sons... *b'yom himashach oto* (on the day he is anointed)... *Mincha Tamid* (a daily meal offering)." * **The Midrash's Logic:** The Midrash asks: Does "on the day he is anointed" mean *only* on that specific day? Answer: No, because the verse also says "*Mincha Tamid*" (daily). So, the daily offering continues forever. Question: Then what does "on the day he is anointed" teach us? Answer: It teaches that the obligation begins *on* the day he is anointed and continues *forever*. * **The Rebbe's Question:** This explanation seems redundant! If "*Mincha Tamid*" already tells us it's daily forever starting from his anointing, what extra information does "*b'yom himashach oto*" add? * **The Rebbe's Insight:** The Midrash isn't just saying the obligation *starts* on that day. It's teaching something profound about the *nature* of the daily obligation (fitting R' Yehuda's "individual" perspective): *Every single day* of the Kohen Gadol's service retains the status and quality of "*the day he is anointed*." The power and significance of the inauguration are not just a one-time event; they are *renewed* each day through the bringing of the *Chavitin*. Each day's offering is, in essence, a re-experiencing or reaffirmation of the inaugural offering (*Minchat Chinuch*). * **Potential Halachic Consequence:** If every day's *Chavitin* has the status of the inaugural *Minchat Chinuch*, this could have practical implications. Just as a Kohen Gadol should ideally not perform any other Temple service (*Avodah*) on his inauguration day *before* bringing his *Minchat Chinuch*, perhaps the same applies *every* day. He might need to bring the morning *Chavitin* before performing other daily services (at least ideally, *l'chatchila*). **Section I: Connecting to Chasidic Thought – Likutei Torah** The Rebbe concludes by showing how this intricate legal and conceptual analysis aligns beautifully with a Chasidic teaching. * **Likutei Torah's Insight:** The Rebbe references the *Likutei Torah*, a foundational work of Chabad Chasidus by the Alter Rebbe (Rabbi Shneur Zalman of Liadi). In explaining the "Chasidic dimension" of the Parsha, Likutei Torah also addresses the phrase "*b'yom* himashach oto" ("*on* the day he is anointed"). * **The Question:** Why does the Torah say "*on* the day" instead of "*from* the day" (*miyom*), given that it's a continuous daily offering? * **The Answer:** The phrasing "*on* the day" is deliberate. It teaches that the purpose is so that "through this [offering], there should be revealed *every single day* until eternity, the quality and level of 'the day he was anointed.'" The spiritual heights and connection achieved on the day of inauguration are meant to be re-accessed and manifested *daily*. * **The Convergence:** The Rebbe points out the remarkable parallel. The legal analysis (*Nigleh*, the revealed aspects of Torah) led to the understanding that, according to the view emphasizing the individual nature of the offering, each day functions *like* the day of anointing, creating a new daily obligation. The Chasidic analysis (*Pnimiyut HaTorah*, the inner dimension) arrives at the same point from a spiritual perspective: each day *reveals the essence* of the day of anointing. **In Summary:** The Rebbe takes a seemingly technical dispute about who pays for an offering when the High Priest dies and unfolds it layer by layer. He shows how this dispute stems from a fundamental difference in understanding the offering's nature – is it primarily personal or communal-like? This understanding then illuminates Rambam's precise wording and Rashi's complex commentary. It further explains a related Talmudic debate about the need to prove the offering's daily continuity and leads to a profound insight into the *nature* of that continuity – a daily renewal of the inaugural experience. Finally, he demonstrates how this intricate legal reasoning resonates perfectly with deep Chasidic teachings on accessing the spiritual power of transformative moments on a daily basis. The Sicha masterfully demonstrates the unity and depth within Torah, where legal details, philosophical concepts, and mystical insights all interrelate and enrich one another.