בהר א

B"H Okay, let's break down this Sicha (a discourse or talk by the Rebbe) step by step. The Rebbe is addressing a fascinating point that arises from connecting two different commandments related to the concept of "the seventh year." **The Starting Point: A Puzzle in the Zohar (Section A)** 1. **The Context:** The Sicha begins with a verse from the Torah portion *Behar*: "The land shall rest a Sabbath to G‑d" (Leviticus 25:2). This refers to the *Shmita* year, the Sabbatical year, which occurs every seventh year. During Shmita, agricultural work in the Land of Israel is forbidden; the land must lie fallow and "rest." 2. **The Zohar's Connection:** The Zohar, a foundational text of Jewish mysticism (Kabbalah), discusses this verse. It brings in *another* verse from a different context: "If you acquire a Hebrew servant, he shall serve for six years, and in the seventh he shall go free for no charge" (Exodus 21:2). This verse deals with the laws of a Hebrew servant (*Eved Ivri*). 3. **The Zohar's Statement:** The Zohar says something intriguing: "Every Jew... has rest during Shmita... In *that* rest of the land, the servants also need rest, and therefore 'in the seventh [year] he shall go free...'" 4. **The Apparent Meaning & The Problem:** Reading this simply, the Zohar seems to be saying that the "seventh year" mentioned for the servant's release *is* the Shmita year. It sounds like the Zohar is interpreting the verse "and in the seventh he shall go free" to mean "in the *Shmita* year, he shall go free." 5. **The Big Question (The `Tmiha`):** This immediately raises a major question, which the Rebbe notes is well-known. Standard Jewish law (*Halacha*), as established in the Talmud and other rabbinic sources, is very clear: A Hebrew servant goes free in the seventh year *of his service*, counting from when he was sold. This personal seventh year might coincide with the universal Shmita year, but usually, it won't. So, how can the Zohar link the servant's release specifically to the Shmita year's rest ("in *that* rest of the land...") when the Halacha says it depends on his personal timeline? It seems like a direct contradiction! 6. **Why it Matters:** It's highly unlikely that the Zohar, a sacred and authoritative text, would contradict established Halacha found throughout rabbinic literature. We need to find a way to understand the Zohar's statement that aligns with Halacha. **Introducing a Key Concept: L'chatchila vs. B'dieved (Section B)** To resolve this, the Rebbe introduces a fundamental concept in Jewish thought regarding Mitzvah observance: 1. **Two Levels of Fulfillment:** When performing a Mitzvah (a commandment), there's an ideal way to do it, called *L'chatchila* (Hebrew for "from the outset" or "ideally"). There's also a way that is acceptable and fulfills the obligation, but isn't the ideal, called *B'dieved* (Aramaic for "after the fact" or "less than ideal"). 2. **Applies Even to Torah Law:** The Rebbe notes that later commentators explain this distinction applies even to commandments directly from the Torah (*D'oraisa*), not just rabbinic enactments. 3. **Even Core Elements:** Furthermore, this isn't just about minor details. Sometimes, even an element that seems central to the Mitzvah might be missing, yet the Mitzvah is still considered fulfilled, albeit *B'dieved*. This happens when that specific element is not deemed *absolutely essential* to prevent fulfillment (*Lo L'ikuvah* - "not indispensable"). The Rebbe mentions a general principle from the laws of sacrifices: only something the Torah *explicitly states* prevents the fulfillment of the Mitzvah actually does so (`Shanah Hakasuv Alav L'akev`). **Applying the Concept Differently: Ideal vs. Acceptable States of the Mitzvah Itself (Section C)** The Rebbe now takes the *L'chatchila/B'dieved* concept a step further: 1. **Beyond Personal Performance:** The difference isn't just about how *we* perform the Mitzvah. Sometimes, the *Mitzvah itself* can exist in different states or situations, one being more complete or ideal (*L'chatchila*) and another being less complete but still valid (*B'dieved*-like state). 2. **Example 1: Yom Tov (Holidays) and Sacrifices:** * *The Ideal (L'chatchila):* When the Holy Temple stood in Jerusalem, the holidays (like Pesach, Shavuot, Sukkot) involved bringing specific sacrifices (public and individual offerings like the *Olas Re'iyah* and *Shalmei Chagigah*). This was the *complete* way to observe the holiday. * *The Less Complete (B'dieved-like state):* Since the Temple was destroyed, we can no longer bring these sacrifices. However, we still observe the holidays according to Torah law. The holiday exists, its sanctity is present, but it lacks the dimension of the sacrifices. This is a less complete, *B'dieved*-like state *inherent in the current situation*, yet the Mitzvah of observing the holiday is still fully binding. * *Another Angle:* Even when the Temple stood, someone who didn't own land in Israel was exempt from the pilgrimage obligation (*Aliyah L'regel*) and the associated individual sacrifices, yet they still observed the holiday fully according to the Torah. 3. **Why This Matters:** The sacrifices weren't just some minor addition; they were central to the Temple-era holiday experience. The Rebbe suggests they weren't just *caused by* the holiday, but were *part of the perfection* of the holiday itself. Nevertheless, the holiday can exist without them. 4. **Example 2: Yom Tov vs. Chol HaMoed:** * *Chol HaMoed* (the intermediate days of Pesach and Sukkot) are part of the festival ("times for rejoicing") and have a Torah obligation of joy. * However, they don't have the full restrictions and sanctity of *Yom Tov* itself (the first and last days). Yom Tov is the holiday in its *full completeness*; Chol HaMoed is related but represents a less intense or less complete form of the festival's sanctity. **Applying the Principle to Sefiras HaOmer (Counting the Omer) (Section D)** Now, the Rebbe applies this idea to resolve another famous difficulty, this time concerning *Sefiras HaOmer*, the counting of the 49 days between Pesach and Shavuot: 1. **The Verse and the Problem:** The Torah says, "You shall count for yourselves *mimochoras haShabbos* - from the day after the Sabbath..." (Leviticus 23:15). The simple meaning of "Shabbos" is Saturday. The Sadducees (a historical sect) took this literally, starting the count always on a Sunday. However, the Oral Law (Torah Shebe'al Peh), as explained by the Sages, interprets "Shabbos" here as referring to the *festival* day of rest – specifically, the first day of Pesach. So, we start counting on the second night of Pesach. 2. **The Question:** If the Torah *means* "the day after the first day of Pesach," why doesn't it just say that? Why use the potentially confusing term "mimochoras haShabbos," which seems to invite misinterpretation? 3. **The Rebbe's Explanation (Using the Principle):** The Torah uses "mimochoras haShabbos" because this describes the Mitzvah in its *most perfect, ideal (L'chatchila) state*. When does this happen? When the first day of Pesach *actually falls on Shabbos* (Saturday). In such a year, we *do* begin counting "the day after the Shabbos." 4. **Two Levels of the Mitzvah:** So, Sefiras HaOmer exists on two levels: * *The Essential Requirement (B'dieved/Necessary):* Counting must begin on the second night of Pesach, regardless of the day of the week. This is the core obligation. * *The Ideal Completeness (L'chatchila):* When Pesach begins on Shabbos, and the count starts "the day after the Shabbos," the Mitzvah achieves a higher level of perfection or completeness. 5. **Why the Torah Says It This Way:** The Written Torah (Torah Shebiksav) often describes a Mitzvah in its most complete and ideal form. Therefore, it uses the phrase "mimochoras haShabbos" to allude to this perfect state, even though the practical obligation always starts after the first day of Pesach. **Supporting Evidence from a Midrash (Section E)** The Rebbe brings support for this idea from a Midrash that discusses the verse requiring the counting weeks to be "complete" (`Temimos`): 1. **The Midrash:** The Midrash asks, "When are they [the weeks] complete?" and answers, "When [the priestly families of] Yeshua and Shechanyah are not [serving in the Temple] between Pesach and Atzeres [Shavuos]." Commentators explain this refers to a calendar year when Pesach falls on Shabbos, meaning the count starts on Sunday ("the day after the Shabbos" in its literal sense). The Midrash adds that *then* "the Shabbos weeks are complete like the six days of creation." 2. **The Difficulty:** This Midrash seems problematic. The requirement for the count to be "complete" (`Temimos`) applies *every* year (e.g., if you miss a day, you continue counting without a blessing; the counting should ideally be done at night). Why does the Midrash link this completeness *specifically* to the year when counting starts on Sunday? Doesn't this strengthen the Sadducees' argument? 3. **The Rebbe's Interpretation (Levels of Completeness):** The Rebbe explains that there are *degrees* of completeness. * *Basic Completeness (Required/`L'ikuvah`):* Counting all 49 days properly is the essential completeness required every year. * *Ideal Completeness (L'chatchila):* The *ultimate* perfection, the "completeness like the six days of creation," occurs only when Pesach falls on Shabbos. 4. **Conclusion:** The Midrash isn't saying completeness *only* exists in that specific year. It's saying that the *highest level* of completeness, the ideal state alluded to by the Torah, happens in that year. **Extending the Idea to Shavuos (Section F)** The Rebbe further applies this principle to understand the connection between Shavuos and the Giving of the Torah (*Matan Torah*): 1. **The Shavuos Date Puzzle:** When the calendar was determined by sighting the new moon, the months of Nissan and Iyar could vary in length. This means Shavuos (the 50th day after the start of the Omer count) could fall on the 5th, 6th, or 7th day of the month of Sivan. However, tradition holds that the Torah was given on the 6th (or according to some, the 7th) of Sivan. How can Shavuos be so intrinsically linked to *Matan Torah* if its date can fluctuate relative to the historical date? 2. **The Connection:** The Sages strongly link Shavuos and *Matan Torah*. For example, the Jerusalem Talmud explains why the word "sin" (`Chet`) isn't explicitly mentioned with the Shavuos sacrifices (unlike other holidays) by saying, "Since you accepted the yoke of Torah upon yourselves [on this day], I consider it as if you never sinned." This clearly ties the essence of Shavuos to receiving the Torah. 3. **The Rebbe's Explanation (Ideal Shavuos):** * *The Purpose of the Omer:* Counting the Omer is understood as a period of eager anticipation and preparation for receiving the Torah. We count the days drawing closer to the great event. Spiritually (in Chasidus), the 49 days correspond to refining the 49 levels of understanding (*Shaarei Binah*) to reach the 50th Gate (*Shaar HaNun*), which represents *Matan Torah*. * *The Ideal vs. The Actual:* Although the timing of the Omer count means Shavuos (the 50th day) might not always coincide with the historical date of *Matan Torah* (it could even be *before* the 6th of Sivan), the *ideal*, most *complete* state of Shavuos (`L'chatchila`) is when it *does* fall on the anniversary of *Matan Torah*. * *Why No "Sin" Mentioned:* Since the Torah often describes things in their ideal state, it omits the word "sin" from the Shavuos sacrifices because, in its perfect form, Shavuos *is* the day of *Matan Torah*, the day Israel achieved a state of sinlessness. The Torah text reflects the Mitzvah's highest potential. **Applying the Principle Across Different Mitzvos with a Shared Theme (Section G)** The Rebbe shows this principle can also apply when comparing two *separate* Mitzvos that share a common theme: 1. **Example: Remembering the Exodus (`Zechiras Yetzias Mitzrayim`):** * *Two Mitzvos:* There's a Mitzvah to recount the story of the Exodus in detail on the night of the 15th of Nissan (the Seder night). There's also a separate Mitzvah to *remember* the Exodus every single day and night throughout the year. * *The Difference:* While both Mitzvos concern the Exodus, the way they are fulfilled is vastly different. The Seder night involves elaborate storytelling, specific rituals (Matzah, Maror, Four Cups), and deep discussion. The daily remembrance is typically brief (reciting relevant verses in prayers). * *The Reason (Ideal vs. Consequence):* The night of the 15th of Nissan is the *actual time* the Exodus occurred. Therefore, the Mitzvah performed on this night is the *primary*, most *complete* (`L'chatchila`) form of commemorating the event. The daily remembrance is seen as a *consequence* or ongoing effect (`Peulah Nimsheches`) stemming from the original event and its primary commemoration. Since the Exodus is an event with continuous impact, we remember it daily, but this daily remembrance is naturally less elaborate, a *reflection* rather than the full experience – a *B'dieved*-like state relative to the Seder night's completeness. **A Non-Mitzvah Example: Temple Appointees (Section H)** The Rebbe offers a fascinating example from the Mishnah that isn't about a Mitzvah but illustrates the same underlying principle: 1. **The Mishnah:** A Mishnah in Tractate Shekalim lists the names of specific individuals who held appointed positions in the Temple ("These were the appointees in the Temple...") and describes their duties (e.g., "Yochanan ben Pinchas over the seals..."). 2. **The Puzzle:** The Mishnah is primarily a book of Halacha (Jewish Law). Why would it list the specific names of people who lived generations ago? What practical legal relevance (`L'mai Nafke Mina`) does this historical information have? As the Talmud sometimes asks rhetorically, "What happened, happened!" (`Mai D'hava Hava`). 3. **An Explanation (R' Ovadia Bartenura):** The commentator R' Ovadia Bartenura explains that these were the *first* appointees for these roles, and subsequent appointees in later generations were *called by the names* of these originals. 4. **The Rebbe's Insight (Why Call Them By Original Names?):** Why was this done? The Rebbe explains it using the principle that names reflect essence and qualities (`R' Meir Havah Dayek Bishma` - R' Meir would infer things from names). * *The Ideal Appointees:* The original individuals listed in the Mishnah were likely chosen because their inherent character traits and abilities, hinted at by their names, perfectly suited the specific Temple duties they were given. They represented the *ideal* (`L'chatchila`) person for the job. * *Later Appointees:* In later generations, when new people needed to be appointed, they looked for individuals who fit the required profile. However, these later appointees had their own names. Calling them by the *names of the original appointees* served a purpose: it signified the *ideal standard* they were expected to live up to. * *Completeness Implication:* The very fact that later appointees had different birth names implies that while they were suitable, they might only have possessed a *likeness* or *reflection* (`Me'ein`) of the ideal qualities embodied perfectly by the originals. Their appointment represented a fulfillment of the role, but perhaps not with the same *innate perfection* or *completeness* as the first ones who *naturally* bore those names and embodied those traits. **Solving the Original Zohar Puzzle (Section I)** Finally, the Rebbe returns to the initial question about the Zohar and the Hebrew servant: 1. **Connecting the Dots:** Just like we saw with the Exodus remembrance (Pesach night vs. daily) and the Temple appointees (original vs. later), we can now understand the two "seventh year" concepts: * *Shmita Year:* This is the "seventh year" for the entire nation of Israel, the Sabbatical rest for the *land*. * *Servant's Seventh Year:* This is the personal "seventh year" for an individual servant, marking their freedom. 2. **Shared Theme, Different Levels:** Both involve the concept of "seventh" and "rest/release." They have a common theme (`Tzad Hashaveh`). Crucially, the individual servant is part of the collective nation of Israel. 3. **The Rebbe's Resolution:** * *Shmita as the Ideal (`L'chatchila`):* The Shmita year represents the concept of "Sabbath to G‑d" in its *fullest, most complete national and spiritual expression*. It involves a whole set of laws impacting the entire land and people. * *Servant's Release as a Reflection (`Me'ein`/`B'dieved`-like state):* The servant's release in their personal seventh year is a *reflection*, an individual manifestation (`Me'ein`), of that same grand concept of seventh-year rest embodied perfectly by Shmita. His freedom is his personal "Sabbath." 4. **Understanding the Zohar:** The Zohar states, "In *that* rest of the land (`Behaha Niycha D'Ara`), the servants also need rest (`Itzt'richu Avdei Niycha`)." The Rebbe explains: The Zohar is linking the servant's release (his personal rest, `Avdei Niycha`) to its *conceptual source and ideal archetype* – the Shmita rest (`Niycha D'Ara`). The servant needs to go free because his individual seventh year derives its meaning and power from the ultimate seventh-year rest, the Shmita. The Zohar isn't giving a practical Halacha about *when* the servant goes free; it's explaining the *deeper reason* by pointing to the *perfect, complete form* of the concept. 5. **Analogy to Sefiras HaOmer:** Just as the Torah says "mimochoras haShabbos" because that describes the *ideal* state of Sefiras HaOmer, the Zohar speaks about the servant's release in the context of the Shmita year's rest because *that* is the concept in its most complete form. 6. **A Novel Insight (`Chidush`):** The Rebbe adds a fascinating point (and notes it requires further research - `Tzorech Iyun V'Chipus BaSfarim`): Perhaps when a servant's personal seventh year of servitude *coincides* with the actual Shmita year, his release achieves a unique, higher level of *completeness* (`Shleimus`). The confluence of the individual reflection and the universal ideal might create a qualitatively enhanced freedom. (The practical implications - `L'mai Nafke Mina` - are unclear, the Rebbe notes). **Conclusion:** The Rebbe's Sicha masterfully resolves the apparent contradiction between the Zohar and Halacha by introducing a profound principle: The Torah (and related sacred texts like the Zohar) sometimes describes a concept or Mitzvah not just by its minimal requirements, but by its *ideal, most perfect state (L'chatchila)*. * The Shmita year is the *ideal* "seventh-year rest." * The servant's release in his seventh year is a *reflection* of this ideal. * The Zohar links the servant's release to the Shmita rest because it's explaining the phenomenon by referring to its perfect archetype and conceptual source. This approach not only solves the initial problem but also sheds light on difficulties related to Sefiras HaOmer ("morrow of the Sabbath"), Shavuos (its connection to the date of Matan Torah), the difference between Pesach night and daily Exodus remembrance, and even the naming conventions for Temple appointees. It reveals a consistent pattern in how Torah concepts relate to each other, distinguishing between the essential core and the ultimate perfection.